Our Featured Cases
Upon dissolution of marriage, Husband and Wife disagreed as to the disposition of six cryogenically preserved embryos, formed from themselves and stored for future use. They had previously signed an agreement that Wife would have the authority to decide. The trial court gave effect to that agreement and ordered the frozen embryos destroyed. The court of appeals affirmed. The contractual right to possess or dispose of frozen embryos is personal property and is subject to the court’s authority to divide at dissolution of marriage. Husband argued that his interest in preserving life should outweigh Wife’s interest in avoiding genetic parenthood, but the court found no affirmative state policy to support Husband’s preference. By giving effect to the parties’ prior agreement, the trial court accomplished a just and proper result.
Husband inherited property during the marriage by operation of California law (intestate succession). He maintained strict control over his inheritance, but chose to use some of his funds to move his family onto an Oregon farm, to improve the farm property, and to support himself and the family living there. The trial court properly exercised its discretion to award to Husband the value of his initial purchase of the farm property and the funds and property remaining from his original inheritance, and to divide the appreciation in property value equally between Husband and Wife.
The trial court made no findings of the parties’ future incomes or earning capacities, but awarded Wife $4,000 per month spousal support. Support can be based on predicted future income, but the prediction must be based on the facts existing at the time of the award. Based on the record here, Husband’s ability to pay $4,000 was speculative. The court of appeals reduced the award to $400 per month, an amount within Husband’s current ability to pay, subject to future modification.
The court may modify a parenting plan only in accordance with the best interests of the child. Mother did not establish that the child was better served by her proposed move to Chicago than by remaining in Klamath Falls. The court therefore disallowed Mother’s proposed relocation.
Wife inherited ranch property from her father during the marriage. By statute, it is presumed that both spouses contributed equally to the acquisition. Wife rebutted this presumption by establishing that her father disliked her husband and did not intend to benefit Husband by devising this property to Wife. However, the parties treated the ranch as a joint asset, using income jointly, paying expenses jointly, investing proceeds from the sale of their previous home into the ranch property, using the ranch as a mutual residence for a period of time; so it was just and proper that it be subject to division upon the dissolution of marriage. Even so, Wife would receive a larger share of the value, since the ranch had been in her family for 82 years and she was much more involved in its operation.
Where the parties had owned and run a business together, and the future prospects for the business were uncertain, it was just and equitable for the court to award each of them an equal number of shares of stock, including voting rights, regardless of a prior agreement between them by which Wife had given Husband her “right to any voting stock.” Voting rights are an asset subject to the court’s authority. Where Wife was employed and earning, Husband was unemployed, capable, but had not sought employment, and each party was awarded substantial property, it was just and equitable for the court not to award spousal support in any amount.
The court articulated the rules for dividing separately-acquired property upon divorce. In dividing property between divorcing parties, as to each asset, the court must (1) determine whether the asset was acquired during the marriage. The statutory presumption of equal contribution applies to these marital assets. The presumption doesn’t apply to any assets acquired separately by either party before the marriage. (2) determine whether the presumption has been rebutted—by a showing, for example, that one party acquired the asset during the marriage without any, or without an equal, contribution from the other. (3) consider whether awarding all marital property according to the respective contributions of each party will ultimately be just and proper in all the circumstances, or if other considerations (if one party acquired property separately, for example, but then integrated the asset into both parties’ financial business) require a different property division.
Determining whether the "defense of marriage" measure adopted at the 2004 general election was an amendment or a revision of the Oregon Constitution; determining whether the measure violated the constitutional "separate vote" requirement for amendments.
The court explored the interaction between the terms of an enforceable premarital agreement and the statutory mandate that the court divide the parties’ property “as may be just and proper in all the circumstances.” The parties’ premarital agreement designated California law to apply, so California law would govern the interpretation of the agreement, but Oregon law would determine how the parties’ property would be divided upon dissolution of their marriage. Where the terms of an enforceable premarital agreement apply, it may be “just and proper” as a matter of Oregon law simply to allow the premarital agreement to determine the property division. Where those terms do not apply to specific property items, the court will apply Oregon law as it otherwise would.
Establishing that the value of a personal services business upon divorce cannot include the value of a hypothetical covenant not to compete.
Wife’s parents gave her stock and cash over a period of years during the parties’ marriage. Wife rebutted the presumption that Husband had contributed equally to the acquisition of these assets where a preponderance of the evidence showed that Wife was the sole object of her parents’ donative intent and that Husband did not contribute to acquiring the gifts. She largely preserved her gift funds separately from other funds, but kept them in joint accounts in both names, demonstrating her intent to make them joint assets. She also added some of her earnings and used some of the commingled funds for specific purchases. But commingling is not an all or nothing proposition. Wife would not be awarded all of her funds, nor would Husband be given an equal share; instead, the court divided them 75/25.
The appreciation in the value of a pre-marital asset, occurring during the marriage, is itself a marital asset which can be considered separately, and to which the presumption of equal contribution applies. In this case, Husband rebutted the presumption of equal contribution where gains to the value of his stock were passive gains, where contributions to his retirement accounts were from his pre-marital savings, and where he managed his own investments without help from Wife. Wife did not indirectly contribute to the appreciation by working as a homemaker, where both parties worked outside the home and both parties shared in housekeeping responsibilities she could not claim to have managed the household herself. Nor did Wife indirectly contribute to the appreciation by earning income, without evidence that her income kept the parties from liquidating Husband’s separate assets.
